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Substantive Principles 
As described in Chapter Two, there are two values that guide
decisionmaking for competent patients: promoting patient welfare and
respecting patient self-determination. They should also guide 
decisionmaking for incapacitated patients, though of necessity their
implementation must differ. They are reflected, roughly speaking, in the
two different standards that have traditionally guided decisionmaking for 
the incapacitated: “substituted judgment” and “best interests.” Although
these standards are now used in health care situations, they have their
origins in a different context—namely, the resolution of family disputes 
and decisions about the control of the property of legal incompetents. 
When people become seriously disabled and unable to manage their
property, they may be judged incompetent and a guardian appointed to
make financial and property decisions. These doctrines were developed
to instruct guardians about the boundaries of their powers without
issuing detailed and specific guidelines and to provide a standard for
guidance of courts that must review decisions proposed by a guardian.1
Simply stated, under the substituted judgment standard, the
decisions made for an incapacitated person should attempt to arrive at
the same choice the person would make if 
1 See generally Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a 
Critique, and a Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1981). 
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competent to do so (but within boundaries of “reasonableness” intended 
to protect the incompetent).2 Under the best interests standard, decisions 
are acceptable if they would promote the welfare of the hypothetical 
“average person” in the position of the incompetent, which may not be 
the same choice the individual would make (but which may still have 
some aspects of subjectivity to it).3
Despite the long legal history of both these standards, they provide 
only hazy guidance for decisionmaking even in their original contexts, 
not to mention in the often far more complex, urgent, and personal 
setting of health care. Although a number of recent cases involving 
decisions about health care for incapacitated patients have given courts 
the opportunity to clarify these often vague guidelines, increased 
confusion may have accompanied some of the attempts to add precision 
to these doctrines. 
Substituted Judgment. The substituted judgment standard requires 
that the surrogate attempt to replicate faithfully the decision that the 
incapacitated person would make if he or she were able to make a choice. 
In so doing, the patient’s interest in achieving well-being as he or she 
defines it in accordance with personal values and goals, as well as the 
individual’s interest in self-determination, are both honored to the 
maximum extent possible, given the fundamental reality that the patient 
literally cannot make a contemporaneous choice. The surrogate’s 
decision is limited, however, by two general external constraints. First, 
the surrogate is circumscribed by the same limitations that society 
legitimately imposes on patients who are capable of deciding for 
themselves,4 such as not compromising public health (e.g., by refusing a 
mandatory vaccination) or not taking steps contrary to the criminal law 
(e.g., intentional maiming). Second, there are certain decisions that a 
patient might be permitted to make but that are outside the discretion of 
substitute decisionmaking and must therefore be decided by the standards 
of “reasonableness.” This is 
2 For example, the substituted judgment doctrine permits a surrogate to make a 
gift of some of an incompetent’s assets to a relative to whom the incompetent 
person had previously made gifts. The court will approve such a gift to the extent 
that it does not endanger funds needed for the incompetent’s support—even if the 
incompetent person would have been willing to be more generous. 
3 The best interests doctrine has received most attention in law in cases involving 
questions of the custody and care of children, see generally 2 C.J.S. Adoption of 
Persons §§ 90-91 (1972), and in cases involving the expenditure of trust funds, 
see generally 76 AM. JUR. 2d, Trusts § 288 (1975), neither of which are entirely 
accurate guides to understanding how the standard ought to operate in instances 
of surrogate health care decisionmaking for adults who lack decisionmaking 
capacity. 
4 See Chapter Two supra. 
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especially true for cases in which the decision risks imposing substantial 
harm on patients or depriving them of substantial benefit; people may 
volunteer for risky research with no direct therapeutic benefits to 
themselves but guardians may not enroll people in such research merely 
because it is known that, when they were competent, they believed that 
such research was very important. Thus even the essentially subjective 
substituted judgment standard is constrained by external limitations—
that is, limitations not arising from the patient’s own views. 
For the substituted judgment standard to be employed there must be 
evidence of the patient’s views, which could be derived from various 
sources. The surrogate may be guided in decisionmaking by prior 
directives expressly made by that patient governing the precise matter at 
issue. A person might, for instance, have clearly stated that he or she 
wished to avoid a potentially beneficial treatment that poses a risk of 
crippled mental faculties if there were another treatment available that, 
although promising more limited benefits, also poses substantially 
smaller risks of damaging the mind. 
The substituted judgment standard is markedly simpler to use—and 
contains greater assurance of being faithfully implemented—when a 
competent individual has given clear directives regarding medical care in 
the event of incapacity, although such a directive does not necessarily 
resolve all problems.5 When directives are written rather than oral, it is 
more likely that the surrogate (or a third party who may report the 
incapacitated patient’s putative directions to the surrogate) will not forget 
or misunderstand the patient’s advance directives. 
In the absence of advance directives, surrogates may be guided by 
the known values, goals, and desires of an incapacitated patient. It can 
reasonably be presumed, for example, that a person who is known to 
have had a particular aversion to painful medical interventions would 
wish to continue avoiding them if possible. 
Best Interests. Decisionmaking guided by the best interests 
standard requires a surrogate to do what, from an objective standpoint, 
appears to promote a patient’s good without reference to the patient’s 
actual or supposed preferences. This does not mean the surrogate must 
choose the means the practitioner thinks is “best” for promoting the 
patient’s well-being, but only a means reasonably likely to achieve that 
goal. Where, for example, there is more than one therapy available, a 
decision in favor of anyone of those considered appropriate by health 
care professionals will be acceptable under the best 
5 See pp. 155-66 supra. 
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interests standard. However, the best interests standard would preclude
the surrogate from choosing a therapy that is totally unacceptable by 
professional standards, even if the surrogate might choose that treatment
for him- or herself. Fundamentally, the standard of “reasonableness” is
inherently cautious. 
In assessing whether a procedure or course of treatment would be in
a patient’s best interests, the surrogate must take into account such
factors as the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of
functioning, and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained.6 An 
accurate assessment will encompass consideration of the satisfaction of 
present desires, the opportunities for future satisfactions, and the
possibility of developing or regaining the capacity for self-determination. 
The impact of a decision on an incapacitated patient’s loved ones
may be taken into account in determining someone’s best interests, for 
most people do have an important interest in the well-being of their 
families or close associates. To avoid abuse, however, especially
stringent standards of evidence should be required to support a claim that
reasonable people would disregard their exclusively self-regarding 
interests (for example, in prolonging or avoiding suffering) in favor of
their interest in avoiding psychological or financial burdens on the
people to whom they were attached. 
The Standard for Surrogate Decisionmaking. The Commission 
believes that decisionmaking for incapacitated patients ought, when
possible, to be guided by the principle of substituted judgment, since it
promotes the underlying values of self-determination and well-being 
better than the best interests standard does. However, the principle of
substituted judgment cannot be employed universally; what some
patients would want if competent cannot always be ascertained because
of insufficient evidence about a patient’s values and preferences or 
because the patient’s cognitive abilities have always been so limited that
he or she was never capable of developing or expressing preferences
about the decision in question.7 When a patient’s likely decision is not 
known, the best interests standard presumes that the individual would 
6 The phrase “quality of life” has been used in differing ways; sometimes it refers 
to the value that the continuation of life has for the patient, and other times to the 
value that others find in the continuation of the patient’s life, perhaps in terms of 
their estimates of the patient’s actual or potential productivity or social 
contribution. In applying the best interest principle, the Commission is concerned 
with the value of the patient’s life for the patient. 
7 Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decision Making for Incompetents, 29 
UCLA L. REV. 393 (1981); John A. Robertson, Legal Criteria for Orders Not to 
Resuscitate: A Response to Justice Liacos, in A. Edward Doudera and J. Douglas 
Peters, eds., LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
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prefer what most reasonable people would want in similar circumstances. 
On certain points, of course, no consensus may exist about what “most 
reasonable people” would prefer. Furthermore, whenever a range of 
choices exists, even a best interests determination will display an element 
of subjectivity on the part of the surrogate in defining and weighing the 
patient’s interests. 
To the extent feasible, efforts should be made with patients who are 
incapacitated though able to engage in communication to take into 
account their expressions of their own values and goals.8 Doing so will 
both promote their welfare as they understand and conceive of it and 
honor self-determination, though of an attenuated kind. When recovery 
of the capacity to make decisions is a reasonable possibility, enhancing 
its prospect should be another goal. 
 
Procedures for Surrogate Decisionmaking 
Regardless of the substantive principle used to guide decisionmaking
for patients lacking decisional capacity, policies and procedures are
needed for the selection and guidance of surrogate decisionmakers.
Furthermore, there is a need to specify the circumstances under which
review of the surrogate’s decision should be permitted or required and
who should undertake such a review. The Commission recommends that
however these problems are actually to be resolved, health care
institutions should have clear policies about who has the authority and
responsibility to determine incapacity, to speak for the patient, and to
review determinations and decisions. 
The Selection of a Surrogate. A sound policy for decisionmaking 
for incapacitated patients should take into account the urgency of the 
need to make a decision and the existence of suitable substitutes such as 
interested family members or a legal guardian. 
ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL
PATIENTS, AUPHA Press, Washington, D.C. (1982) at 159-63. 
8 The only necessary implication of a determination of incapacity to decide about
health care is that the patient’s decision, if any, may be overruled. Even if
patients’ decisionmaking capacities are sufficiently impaired that it would be
inappropriate to take their preferences as binding, patients may still be able to
appreciate many aspects of the decision and may feel they have been treated 
more respectfully if those vested with the power to make decisions about them
recognize the extent to which they are sentient beings with values and
preferences of their own. Encouraging participation in the decisionmaking 
process may in fact facilitate recovery of capacity under some circumstances.
These patients would be well served if their surrogates were to let them make
such decisions for themselves, although the surrogate’s permission may also be
required. 
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Emergencies. When a decision must be made immediately, in order
to avoid seriously jeopardizing a patient’s life or well-being, health care
professionals are the proper decisionmakers.9 Since such emergency care
is so often provided in institutional settings involving many practitioners,
one aspect of a sound policy is having the means to assign
decisionmaking authority to a particular member of the treatment team.
This person should usually be the available professional who is most
qualified to make the decision, according to the provider’s estimate of
the patient’s best interests. 
The line between emergency and nonemergency decisions will
sometimes be hard to draw and will depend in part upon the type of
facility and the ready availability of additional personnel for quick
consultation. Institutional policy should minimize any tendency to
overextend the exceptionally broad decisionmaking authority that
genuine emergencies confer on practitioners. As soon as possible,
without compromising the patient’s well-being, other surrogates (such as
family members) should be located, informed about the choices to be
made, and involved in the decisionmaking.10
Nonemergency situations. In nonemergency situations, the proper
presumption is that the family, defined to include closest relatives and
intimate friends,11 should make health care decisions for an incapacitated
patient. There are several grounds for this stance: 
(1) The family is generally most concerned about the good  
      of the patient. 
9 Allen Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or Legal Imperialism: Not the Only 
Alternatives for Handling Saikewicz-type Cases, 5 LAW & MED. 97, 105-06 
(1979); Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine: 
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 
WIS. L. REV. 413, 476. 
10 Meisel, supra note 9, at 476. 
11 The Commission’s broad use of the term “family” reflects a recognition of the
fact that many of those with most knowledge and concern for the patient may not 
be his or her actual relatives. The fact that more than one person may fall within
this category points to the need to designate one person as the principal
decisionmaker for the incapacitated patient. One possibility is to define a 
presumptive priority, e.g., that a person living with his or her spouse will speak 
for that spouse, that adult children will speak for elderly widowed parents, etc. In
some cases such presumptions may be helpful. Nevertheless, the Commission
believes that it is the responsibility of the practitioner to determine who acts as
the patient’s “surrogate.” No neat formulas or serial orderings will suffice to
capture the complexities involved in determining who among the individuals
presenting themselves as friends and relatives of the patient knows the patient 
best and has his or her best interests in view. The responsibility is therefore on
the practitioner either to determine who this spokesperson is or to go to court to
have a guardian appointed. 
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(2) The family will also usually be most knowledgeable about
the patient’s goals, preferences, and values. 
(3) The family deserves recognition as an important social unit
that ought to be treated, within limits, as a single
decisionmaker in matters that intimately affect its members. 
Especially in a society in which many other traditional forms of
community have been eroded, participation in a family is often an
important dimension of personal fulfillment. Since a protected sphere of
privacy and autonomy is required for the flourishing of this interpersonal
union, institutions and the state should be reluctant to intrude,
particularly regarding matters that are personal and on which there is a
wide range of opinion in society. 
The presumption that the family is the principal decisionmaker may
be challenged for any of a number of reasons: decisional incapacity of
family members, unresolvable disagreement among competent adult
members of the family about the correct decision, evidence of physical 
or psychological abuse or neglect of the patient by the family, evidence
of bias against the patient’s interest due to conflicting interests, or
evidence that the family intends to disregard the patient’s advance
directive or the patient’s undistorted, stable values and preferences.12
Even if, for one or more of these reasons, the family is disqualified from
being the principal decisionmaker, it will often be appropriate to include
family members in the decisionmaking process. 
12 Buchanan, supra note 9, at 111. 
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Nonemergency situations in which an incapacitated patient has no
family but does have a court-appointed guardian raise special issues that 
are sometimes overlooked. The considerations that support a strong 
presumption in favor of the family’s being the principal decisionmaker
are weaker in the case of a court-appointed guardian, unless the guardian 
had been nominated by the patient prior to his or her incapacitation (in
which case the guardian would be included in the definition of family
used here).13 In the absence of disqualifying reasons, a guardian should
act as health care decisionmaker since the person was already making the
patient’s other, nonhealth-related decisions. Through involvement in past 
decisionmaking, the guardian may have acquired a knowledge of the
patient’s beliefs, concerns, and values. Finally, in addition to the ethical
grounds there are legal ones: the guardian has the sanction of court
authority, which should reduce the concerns of practitioners that
following this particular surrogate’s decisions will expose them to civil
liability. 
If no family or legal guardian is initially available, a suitable
surrogate decisionmaker should be designated to ensure a clear 
assignment of authority for decisionmaking and of responsibility for the
exercise of this authority. Unless a suitable surrogate decisionmaker is
identified, treatment decisions may lack continuity or may rest on an
unclear foundation, making it difficult if not impossible to ensure that the 
process by which decisions are made is ethically and legally sound. 
Review Procedures. Many people have “natural guardians” whose 
authority is either recognized as a matter of law (for example, parents
deciding for children) or as a matter of custom (for example, one spouse
deciding for the other).14 The decisions made by such surrogates are not 
routinely subjected to formal review. Such review is more likely to occur
when very significant medical interventions are being contemplated, 
when disagreement arises between health professionals and surrogate
decisionmakers, or when decisions are made by a guardian appointed by
the court. 
Formal review appears to be occurring with greater frequency; at
the least, it is being more widely reported in the press. Review may be
more frequent because of practitioners’ growing sensitivity to the need to
protect the interests of patients or because of their increased fear of legal
liability, from which an advance ruling by a court could insulate them.15
13 If an incapacitated patient has both a competent family and a legal guardian,
they should function together as principal decisionmakers to the extent permitted
by local law. 
14 See note 10, Chapter Eight supra. 
15 See generally Robert A. Burt, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS, The Free 
Press, New York (1979). 
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Although state law may require judicial review of certain decisions 
by a surrogate, well-conceived and carefully executed institutional 
guidelines may eliminate recourse to the courts that is unnecessary for 
adequate protection of patients’ interests. Certainly, formal court 
proceedings on each and every health care determination would be 
unduly intrusive, slow, and costly and would frame treatment decisions 
in misleadingly adversarial terms.16
Judicial review. The most important kind of formal review at the 
moment is judicial. The justifications for turning to the courts are: (1) the 
state has a proper role, as parens patriae, in protecting the helpless, such 
as patients lacking health care decisionmaking capacity; (2) the authority 
of the state is legitimately exercised by courts in life-and-death matters, 
as in other important situations requiring individual decision; and (3) 
courts can reach appropriate judgments because of their expertise and 
disinterested stance in the resolution of disputes,17 
Greater reliance on advance judicial review has raised a number of 
concerns about the relative costs and benefits of relying on courts to pass 
on the decisions of surrogates for incapacitated patients. Judicial review 
in such cases is costly in terms of time and expense; it can disrupt the 
process of providing care for a patient, since medical decisionmaking is 
evolutionary rather than static; it can create unnecessary strains in the 
relationship between the surrogate decisionmaker and others, such as the 
health care providers, who may be forced into the role of formal 
adversaries in the litigation; and it exposes delicate matters that are 
usually regarded as private 
16 Nevertheless, arrangements should be made to ensure that the appropriate 
cases do come before a formal tribunal, as when, for example, the patient 
expresses a desire for judicial review, or the patient’s health needs will require 
continual decisionmaking on a broad range of issues. Further, it is incumbent 
upon health care providers to seek review when they believe that a surrogate’s 
decision about treatment fails to reflect the patient’s values and goals (to the 
extent that they are ascertainable) or the patient’s best interests. 
17 The argument for judicial review is well stated by Professor Baron. See 
Charles H. Baron, Assuring “Detached But Passionate Investigation and 
Decision”: The Role of Guardians Ad Litem in Saikewicz-Type Cases, 4 AM. J. 
LAW & MED. 111 (1978); Charles H. Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule 
of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 AM. J. LAW & MED. 337 (1979). See also In 
re Roe, 421, N.E.2d 40,51-56 (Mass. 1981); Superintendent of Belchertown State 
School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432-35 (1977). The view that judicial 
review is inappropriate is well stated by Dr. Relman, the editor of the NEW 
ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE. See Arnold S. Relman, The Saikewicz 
Decision: A Response to Allen Buchanan’s Views on Decision Making for 
Terminally Ill Incompetents, 5 AM. J. LAW & MED. 119 (1979). 
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to the scrutiny of the courtroom and sometimes even to the glare of the
communications media.18
These costs may be justifiable if wiser decisions are made and if 
patients are provided with additional protection from harm. Frequently,
however, it appears that the process of judicial review is merely a
formality. Judges may not feel that they are able to add very much to the
decisions already reached by those most intimately involved, particularly
in cases that are brought simply to obtain judicial sanction for an agreed
course of conduct,19 Rather than being an issue the courts are 
accustomed to addressing, such as whether the surrogates are appropriate 
decisionmakers or should be disqualified because they are incompetent
or have a conflict of interest, the question typically addressed is whether
the treatment chosen is the right one.20 Since this judgment 
18 Buchanan, supra note 9, at 105-06. 
19 See, e.g., In re Nemser, 51 Misc.2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 629 (S.Ct. 1966),
in which a trial court judge to whom a petition for the appointment of a guardian
to consent to surgery on an elderly, somewhat incapacitated, but objecting
woman, chided the woman’s family, the hospital, and the doctors for seeking his
imprimatur: 
[I]t is apparent that this proceeding was necessitated only because of the
current practice of members of the medical profession and their
associated hospitals of shifting the burden of their responsibilities to the
courts, to determine, in effect, whether doctors should proceed with
certain medical procedures definitively found necessary or deemed
advisable for the health, welfare, and perhaps even the life of a patient
who is either unwilling or unable to consent thereto.... 
It seems incongruous in light of the physicians’ oath that they even seek
legal immunity prior to action necessary to sustain life. [H]ow legalistic
minded our society has become, and what an ultra-legalistic maze we
have created to the extent that society and the individual have become
enmeshed and paralyzed by its unrealistic entanglements! 
See also William J. Curran, A Problem of Consent, Kidney Transplantation in
Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1959) 
20 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976): 
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative
existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident
of her right of privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be
discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious
exercise of the choice. The only practical way to prevent destruction of
the right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best 
judgment subject to the qualification hereinafter stated, as to whether 
she would exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is in the 
affirmative this decision should be accepted by a society the 
overwhelming majority of whose members 
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requires substantial understanding of the patient’s medical condition and 
options, the court may simply defer to the recommendation of the 
treating physicians. The courts’ vaunted disinterest may be closer, in 
practical effect, to lack of interest. 
Institutional review. To provide an alternative that is more 
responsive to the needs of all parties, “institutional ethics committees”21 
are increasingly being used.22 Because they are closer to the treatment 
setting, because their deliberations are informal and typically private (and 
are usually regarded by the participants as falling within the general rules 
of medical confidentiality), and because they can reconvene easily or can 
delegate decisions to a separate subgroup of members, ethics committees 
may have some marked advantages over judicial review when it comes to 
decisionmaking that is rapid and sensitive to the issues at hand. 
Furthermore, testimony presented to the Commission indicated that these 
committees have had a valuable educational role for professionals.23
Very little is known, however, about the actual effectiveness of 
institutional ethics committees, especially in comparison with private, 
informal mechanisms or with judicial decisionmaking for patients who 
lack decisionmaking capacity. The composition and functions of existing 
ethics committees vary substantially from one institution to another. Not 
enough experience has accumulated to date to know the appropriate and 
most effective functions and hence the suitable composition of such 
committees. If their role is to serve primarily as “prognosis committees” 
to pass on the accuracy of an attending physician’s judgment, then 
committees composed largely of physicians would seem appropriate.24 If 
the ethics committees are supposed to reach decisions that best reflect the 
individually defined well-being of patients or the ethicality of decisions, 
however, it seems doubtful that an exclusively medical group would be 
suitable. And if the appropriate role of such review 
would, we think, in similar circumstances exercise such a choice in the
same way for themselves or for those closest to them. 
21 The Commission uses the term “institutional ethics committee” rather than
“hospital ethics committee” because such committees could well function in
other health care institutions such as nursing homes. 
22 In the past decade, 5% of large hospitals (that is, those with more than 200
beds) have established such committees. Stuart Youngner, Hospital Ethics
Committees (1982), Appendix to Commission’s forthcoming Report on decisions
about life-sustaining treatment. 
23 Testimony of Ronald Cranford, M.D., transcript of 21st meeting of the
President’s Commission (June 10, 1982) at 18, 39. 
24 Carole Levine, Hospital Ethics Committees: A Guarded Prognosis, 7(3)
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25, 27 (1977); Robert Veatch, Hospital Ethics
Committees: Is There a Role?, 7(3) HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22, 24 (1977). 
  
188  Making Health Care Decisions: Chapter 9 
bodies should be to determine whether a surrogate decisionmaker is 
qualified to make medical decisions on a patient’s behalf (and to set only
outer boundaries on the nature of the decision reached rather than
second-guessing the choice), membership should be diverse. 
Alternative institutional and private arrangements, formal and
informal, deserve careful examination and evaluation. Furthermore,
important details, such as means of case referral, range of functions,
committee composition, protection of privacy, and legal status, have not 
been debated, much less resolved. From what little is already known, it
seems that ethics committees may be able to take a leading role in
formulating and disseminating policy on decisionmaking for
incapacitated patients, assisting in the resolution of difficult situations, 
and protecting the interests of incapacitated patients. Although
committees can be reasonably prompt, efficient, sensitive, and private,
having many of the decisions about health care for the incapacitated
made in an informal manner between surrogate and provider is plainly a 
desirable objective as well, just as routine decisions for competent
patients should be made by patient and provider without any outside
intervention. Furthermore, just as judicial review may sometimes be an 
unnecessarily onerous means of reviewing medical decisions, review by
an ethics committee may also sometimes be inappropriate. 
The Commission believes there should be various kinds of review
mechanisms available. Thus, the Commission recommends that health 
care institutions not only develop appropriate mechanisms but also
encourage and cooperate in comparative evaluations of such
approaches.25 The results of these studies will have particular importance
for society because one presumed advantage of institutional mechanisms 
is that they avoid the undesirable aspects of having to turn to more
formal means of review. Assurance that any new mechanisms have been
well thought out and are appropriate to the task is needed before
widespread official sanctions can be expected. 
25 To assist in this endeavor, the Commission’s forthcoming report on decisions 
about life-sustaining treatment will provide a more detailed examination of the
potentials, liabilities, and reported experience with institutional ethics
committees and other mechanisms for ensuring that decisionmaking of high
quality occurs. 
